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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration of whatever kind! primarily is a method
to settle disputes. That is also true for adjudication.
Besides dispute settlement, however, judgments of courts
have a second major effect. They develop the law.2 That
is obvious in Common Law countries, where at least the
judgments of higher courts, which state principles and
create within certain limits new rules of law, have
precedential value, in other words, where they are the
law. But that is also true for judgments rendered in
Civil Law countries and judgments of the International
Court of Justice, which have authority. These judgments
might develop some kind of customary law or might in-
fluence a legislature or another lawmaking institution
in the law creating process. The thesis tries to show
that some arbitral awards have a similar effect. It
focuses on arbitral awards rendered in disputes between
states and on those rendered in investment disputes
between states and aliens. The impact of those awards
on the development of international law3 is examined.
Awards rendered in disputes between states and foreign
nationals which are not investment disputes are not
discussed here. Those disputes, which usually deal
with ~, international business transactions
1
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involving sales, supply of equipment, industrial property
licenses, and agency contracts, generally are not
governed by international law. Therefore, awards decid-
ing those disputes hardly have any impact on the develop-
ment of that body of law.4
In Chapter II theoretical considerations concerning
the influence of arbitral awards on the development of
the international law are made. Chapter III, which ex-
amines the impact of arbitral awards on the development
of some rules of the international law concerning the
taking of foreign-owned property, illustrates the role
which arbitral awards rendered in investment disputes
play in the development of international law.
The thesis concludes that arbitral awards do have
an impact on the development of international law.
Strengthening the trust and confidence of potential
parties in the arbitration mechanism and providing for
arbitration of disputes which deal with uncertain and
highly disputed fields of international law may bring
about some certainty in these fields of law and solve
problems which would be unsolveable politically in an
international forum.
3
Endnotes to Chapter I:
1. There is an enormous variety of different kinds of
arbitrations. There is national and international arbitra-
tion, commercial arbitration, labor arbitration, and
maritime arbitration. There is arbitration between states,
between states and private nationals of other states, and
between private parties. There is ad hoc arbitration and
institutional arbitration. There is arbitration in Paris,
London, New York, Stockholm, Washington, to name only a few
centers of international arbitration. There is national
arbitration in important commercial cities allover the
world.
2. see generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921); for the development of inter-
national law through the International Court of Justice see
~ H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1985).
3. for the different use of the term international
law and public international law in the United States
and in other countries see ALI, Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, Tentative Draft No. 6
1985 (hereinafter: Restatement, Draft No.6), paragraph
101, comment c), which points out, that international law
as it is used in the United States and in this thesis in
most countries is referred to as public international
law.
4. those awards may have an impact on the development
of the so-called lex mercatoria, which is said to be a
developing body of law, mainly independent of national
legal systems, and which regulates commercial transactions
in the international business community;
see e.g. Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 747-767 (1985);
R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1985), at 14
and 352 et seq., where the author expresses some doubt as
to whether arbitral awards can develop a new lex
mercatoria; Cremades, The Impact of International Law on
the Development of Business Law, 31 A. J. COMP.L. 526
(1983) .
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ARBITRAL
AWARDS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law, as any law, develops. Its develop-
ment is influenced by a variety of obvious and hidden fac
tors. There is no doubt that published arbitral awardsl
rendered by international tribunals to settle international
disputes on the basis of international law and accompanied
2by reasons are among those factors. International ar-
bitral awards, published and accompanied by reasons,
therefore, do have an impact on the development of interna-
tional law. The questions which are discussed in this
chapter take some impact of arbitral awards on the develop-
ment of international law for granted and focus on dif-
ferent views towards international law which explain the
role of arbitral awards in the international law developing
process (subchapter A), on the methods by which rules are
developed in arbitral awards (subchapter B), and on the
factors which determine the extent to which arbitral
awards have an impact on the development of international
law (subchapter C). Subchapter D concludes this part of
the thesis.
A. The Development of International Law and the Role
of Arbitral Awards therein
The role of arbitral awards in the development
of international law can best be described in
4
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examining this role of arbitral awards from different
viewpoints.
1. Traditional Approach towards International Law in its
modern Form and Arbitral Awards
International law traditionally is described as con-
sistant of "rules and principles of general application
dealing with the conduct of states and of international or-
ganizations and with their relations inter se as well as
with some of their relations with persons, whether natural
or juridical".3 Rules of international law are those which
have been "accepted as such by the international community
of states in the form of customary law, by international
agreement, or by derivation from general principles common
to the major legal systems of the world".4 International
law develops through the development of its sources, that
is primarily through the development of either customary
law or treaty law.S Customary international law results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.6
Arbitral awards as such are neither customary law,
because they do not result from a practice of states, nor,
obviously, treaty law. It follows that the rules and prin-
ciples on which the awards are based are not as such inter-
national law. Consistent with this deduction, there is no
rule of stare decisis,7 which would bind the arbitrators
as to the rules of law they have to apply and which would
6
indicate that the rules, on which a previous award is
based, are as such international law.
International arbitral awards give evidence as to
whether a rule or a state practice has become international
law.8 But this is only part of what arbitral awards do. In
deciding disputes arbitrators have to fill up gaps in the
international law, they have to interpret established rules
and to develop new rules.9 The rules developed in this
process may become international law only, if they become
either customary international law or treaty law. They
become customary law, if they are applied in a general and
consistent practice of states, followed by them out of a
sense of legal obligation. They become treaty law, when
states base a provision of a treaty on a rule developed in
an award.
2. International Law as a Developing Process and Arbitral
Awards
International law is not a static body of law, but a
developing process. This developing process is influenced
by a variety of factors. Such factors are the positions,
which different states or organizations take as to what the
content of the rules of international law are, judicial
decisions, existing customary and treaty law, power, ideas
of what is fair and just, scholarly writing, to name
some.IO All these factors together may influence the per-
ceptions of states of what the law at a certain stage of
its development is and what their positions and practice
7
towards a specific legal question should be. Where the
rules of international law are clear, which is seldom the
case, and where a state wants to act in accordance with
that rules, this rule may easily be found in a treaty or
court decision. Where the rules are uncertain and vague,
as they are especially in rapidly developing fields of
international law, a state, which wants to act in accord-
ance with international law, may look at all the above
mentioned factors, including arbitral awards, to develop
its legal policy.11 The state may then act accordingly. In
acting in accordance with what the state thinks is inter-
national law it is an actor which develops, in the inter-
play with other states, new international customary law.
Arbitral awards together with other judicial decisions
playa distinctive role in that process. Different from
some of the other factors they usually do not represent a
one-sided view towards a legal question, but have taken al-
ready some balancing view upon the different standpoints
towards the question at issue. This impartial approach
supplements the judicial decisions with a higher amount of
authority. Judicial decisions also often produce a degree
of certainty where previously confusion and obscurity ex-
isted. Since they are in search of certainty some states
give them high authority.12 The judicial decisions
including arbitral awards, therefore, are an important
factor in the development of perceptions of the lawmaking
8
states and thus in the development of international law
itself.
Concluding this subchapter it may be stated that while
arbitral awards do not develop international law them-
selves, but rather can and do have an impact on its
development.
B. The Methods by which Arbitrators develop International
Law
Since awards do not develop international law but do
influence its development, arbitrators do not develop law,
but rather create international rules which have an impact
on the development of international law.
Arbitrators develop international rules more or less
the same way as the judges of the International Court of
Justice do. They may create new rules through the inter-
pretation of accepted rules of international law, through
laying down of principles, where there is no generally ac-
cepted rule of international law, and through the applica-
tion of general principles of law. They also may develop
rules through the reliance on principles which have done no
more than give effect to and draw the consequences from
parallel developments in other spheres of international
1 d th h t b d" 13aw an roug ex aequo e ono ec~s~ons.
Arbitrators in formulating international rules on
which they base their awards often have enormously wide
discretion. In contrast to national judges whose lawmaking
power is usually restricted by the constitutional division
9
of power, international judges and arbitrators are not
restricted by any well defined powers of a permanent inter-
national legislature.14 Furthermore, international law,
the law which arbitrators have to apply as substantive law
in disputes between states, if the parties did not agree
otherwise, and in disputes between states and foreign
nationals at least if it were agreed upon, is only vaguely
formulated. The sources of the international law, which
are described in article 38 (1) of the ICJ-statute, them-
selves leave wide room for arbitral discretion to determine
the contents of a rule of international law.14a Even
"equitable considerations" are, as integral part of the
international law, a source on which arbitrators and
judges may base their awards.1S The wide discretion,
however, is not only typical for decisions of arbitrators,
but also for decisions of the judges of the International
Court, who also have to decide on the basis of article 38
(1) of the ICJ-statute and who are not restricted by any
powers of a permanent international legislature. The
similarity shows, that the discretion of arbitrators is
due to the structure of international law and not to the
structure of arbitration as a method of dispute settlement.
It, therefore, does not support the argument that arbi-
trators cannot develop international rules because their
awards are not based on law but on non-legal discretionary
considerations.
10
Arbitrators and judges have an even wider discretion
if the parties have empowered them to decide ex aequo et
bono. In this case the arbitrators and judges can base
their decisions not on specific rules of international
law, but on what they think is a fair and just solution of
d' t 16 h" th 1 d' h th 'ta 1SpU e .. T 1S 1S not e p ace to 1SCUSS, weer 1
is possible to render an ex aequo et bono decision, which
is not based on any kind of legal rule. In any case, ~
aequo et bono awards can have an impact on the development
of international law only if they are based on some kind of
legal rule. This rule may not be stated explicitly in the
award, but has to be the reason behind the decision of the
Tribunal.
In investment disputes between states and foreign
nationals arbitrators may apply the national law of the
state party, if the parties do not agree otherwise. In
these cases awards may create international rules only
insofar, as choice of law issues are concerned. They may,
~, create the rule that such investment disputes are
governed by the national law of the state party.16a In-
sofar as an award applies only national substantive law,
it is unlikely that there is any kind of impact of the
award on the development of international law.
c. Factors which Determine the Extent of the Impact of
Arbitral Awards on the Development of International
Law
It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the
impact of certain arbitral awards and arbitral awards in
11
general on the development of international law. That is
especially difficult when a field of law is rapidly
developing under the influence of a variety of different
factors. However, there are two approaches which lead to
a better understanding of the impact of arbitral awards on
the development of international law. The first approach
is to find the factors which determine the extent to which
an arbitral award has an impact on the development of in-
ternational law. This approach will be discussed in this
subchapter. The second approach focuses on the rules which
are discussed today in certain fields to be those of inter-
national law and on whether these rules were developed or
at least applied in arbitral awards. This second approach
will be taken up in Chapter III.
The extent of the impact of an arbitral award on the
development of international law through the influence on
perceptions of states of what the law is,l? is generally
determined by the authority accorded to an award. This
authority results from an interplay of a variety of factors
which are discussed in this subchapter.
1. Uniqueness of the Issue
There are awards, which are highly respected, but
which do not have any impact on the development of law.
That happens where the legal questions involved are
unique.
In submitting a dispute to arbitration the parties
'l 'h ' 18 h' h ' h tcan StlpU ate ln t e compromls w lC lssue t ey wan to
12
have decided by the arbitrators. Where the stipulated
issue is so special that a comparable problem might not
arise in any other case, the awards do not have an impact
on the development of law.
The lack of impact of these kinds of awards on the
development of international law is illustrated by a
statement of the International Court of Justice in the
Barcelona Traction Case.19 The Court was asked to apply
solutions of legal problems already developed in arbitral
awards. The court said:20 "The parties have also relied
on the general arbitral jurisprudence which has accumulated
in the last half century. However, in most cases the
decisions cited rested upon the terms of instruments estab-
lishing the jurisdiction of the tribunals or claims cornrnis-
sions and determining what rights might enjoy protection;
they cannot therefore give rise to generalization going
beyond the special circumstances of each case."
2. Lack of Decisions of the International Court of Justice
A factor which determines the authority of an award
rendered by an international tribunal is whether there is
or whether there might be a decision of the International
Court of Justice on the issue decided in the award.
Decisions of the International Court of Justice are by far
the most authoritative on the international plane.21 An
arbitral award which solves legal problems contrary to a
decision of the International Court of Justice, rendered
13
before or after the decision of the Court was made, might
therefore have limited authority.
Questions which the Court has not decided yet or
especially questions of international law which might sel-
dom or never arise before the Court may be decided by
arbitral tribunals and the awards may have highest
authority. Arbitral awards rendered in disputes between
states and foreign nationals involving international law
problems, which generally would not be decided by the In-
t' 1 C b f 1 k f' 'd' , 22 fterna 10na ourt ecause 0 ac 0 Jurls lctl0n, or
example, therefore may enjoy high authority.
3. Deciding Authority
Very important factors which determine the authority
of an award are the composition of the deciding tribunal,
the reputation and expertise of the arbitrators, and
whether an arbitration institution is involved or not.
These factors generally determine whether an arbitral
tribunal makes its decision as independently, as com-
petently, and as impartially as possible. The more
independent, more competent, and more impartial decisions
usually have more authority.
An arbitral tribunal composed of three independent
b' t 23, l'k 1 t d 'd d tar ltra ors lS more 1 e y 0 ren er an ln epen en ar-
bitral award than a tribunal which consists out of two
arbitrators, each selected by one party, and an chairman
selected by the two arbitrators.
14
The competence of a tribunal is not only a question
of the number of arbitrators, but also one of the interna-
tiona 1 legal experience of the arbitrators. It might also
happen that a three person tribunal, of which two arbi-
trators were sent by the disputing parties, is highly com-
petent, because the arbitrators themselves know very well
the national legal systems, which playa role in the dis-
pute. Much depends here on the circumstances of each
arbitration.
The involvement of an arbitration institution might
further strengthen the authority of an award. Such in-
stitutions, like the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID)24 or the Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)25, generally
provide for a balanced system of procedural arbitration
rules, which suit for a variety of different disputes. Ad
hoc arbitration agreements may also provide for balanced
25aprocedures. However, the use of an institution renders
more likely that the process will be impartial, competent,
and independent. If, for example, an award is rendered in
a disute between a state and a foreign national under the
auspices of ICSID, it is likely that this award is con-
sidered highly authoritative. The reason is that ICSID
provides for a complex system of procedural rules,26 for an
independent composition of an experienced tribunal,27 for
an annulment proceeding in case of doubts as to the
independence of the arbitrators,28 and that the
15
constituting Convention of which is ratified by nearly 100
29states •
4. Reasons
Another major factor determining the authority of an
award is the stating of reasons in an award. The reasons
of an award, which show that the arbitrators dealt care-
fully with all the involved problems, which show that they
discussed the leading legal opinions on a problem, and
which elaborate a convincing solution, are likely to give
an award high authority.
The importance of stating reasons primarily is based
on the consideration that the loosing party should be con-
vinced that the way in which a dispute is decided is
reasonable. As it was said in the Kloeckner v. Cameroon
30Annulment Award : "it is not enough that justice be done,
it must be seen manifestly to be done".
Reasons are also important for the law developing
function of arbitral awards.3l Without reason it is not
known which rules have been applied and developed by the
arbitrators. Without reasons there are no substantive
rules in an award which could have an impact on the
development of law.
Contrary to the field of commercial arbitration, in
which there is still controversy as to whether arbitral
awards should state reasons or not,32 it is an established
rule that awards rendered in disputes between states have
to state reasons.33 Arbitral awards rendered in disputes
16
between states and foreign nationals under the auspices of
ICSID also have to state reasons.34 It is doubtful,
whether this principle also applies to ad hoc or other
arbitrations of international law disputes between states
and foreign nationals. In view of the importance of the
disputes, however, awards rendered in disputes between
states and aliens generally do state reasons.
5. Publication
If awards are not published they do not have an impact
on the development of law, because those who create the
law generally do not know what rules and principles have
been applied in the unpublished award.
Arbitral awards rendered in disputes between states
are published in the United Nations Reports on Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards.35 Awards rendered in disputes
between states and foreign nationals are sometimes pub-
lished, sometimes not.36
6. Field of Law with which an Award deals
The field of law with which an award primarily deals
also is an important factor, which determines the award's
authority. Arbitral awards rendered in fields of interna-
tional law which are rapidly developing and which are
therefore especially uncertain and vague, often have high
authority because they may create more certainty and
foreseeability in this field of law.
17
7. Concurring and Conflicting Awards
If there is a line of awards which decide a legal
question the same way, then it is quite likely that the
similar rules applied in these awards have strongly in-
fluenced the development of law.
If two awards decide a particular legal issue dif-
ferently,37 and if both awards have a similarly high
authority as a result of the reasons mentioned supra under
2. through 5., then it is quite likely that they have dealt
with an issue which is highly disputed in international
law. The impact of these awards on the development of a
consensus as to what the rules of international law are, is
limited. These awards may clearly point out the different
standpoints as to the question which is disputed, which
might have been unclear and uncertain before. They thus
may further the development of new solutions to the dis-
puted problem.
D. Conclusion to this Chapter
Arbitral awards rendered in disputes between states
and in disputes between states and foreign nationals can
have an impact on the development of international law.
There are factors which in their interplay determine the
extent of that impact. Much depends on the circumstances
under which each award was rendered. Rules developed in
awards rendered in disputes between states may sometimes
have no impact on the development of international law,
18
because the factual and procedural circumstances under
which they were developed have been unique.
19
Endnotes to Chapter II:
1. Arbitral awards which might have an impact on the
development of international law are primarily those
rendered either to settle disputes between states or to
settle disputes between states and foreign nationals.
While the latter are discussed under III of this thesis,
some remarks concerning arbitral awards rendered in dis-
putes between states may be made in this endnote: arbitra-
tion, which has been used as a method do settle disputes
between states for more than 2000 years (see L.B. Sohn,
The function of International Arbitration today, RCADI 1,
9 (1963), with further references), is also today, as ar-
ticle 33 (1) of the United Nations Charter shows, accepted
as a peaceful means of dispute settlement. There have been
around 200 international arbitrations in the 19th century
(id.) and some 100 arbitrations leading to arbitral awards
in this century before the Second World War (see A.M.
STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 17~-1940, 2d
ed. 1972; these figures do not count the cases in which
claims commisions rendered a large number of similar awards
like in the disputes between the European Nations and the
United States on one side and Venezuela before the First
World War, and Mexico after that war, on the other, or the
awards rendered against Germany in connection with the
First World War). Most of the awards dealt with ter-
ritorial and border disputes, questions of international
law concerning neighbor relations, disputes between warring
parties and neutral states based upon discriminatory
measures taken against the latter as part of the conduct of
the wars or based upon questions of internment, disputes
involving the law of the sea, settlement of debts, postal
disputes and disputes concerning the treatment of another
state's nationals in breach of international law (see von
Mangoldt, Arbitration and Conciliation in JUDICIAL SETTLE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, MAX PLANCK INSTITUT FOR
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Heidelberg, 416-
552 (1974), 466 et seq.). Since World War II there have
been less than 20 arbitral awards, rendered in disputes be-
tween states, most of them dealing with disputes involving
claims resulting from World War II against Germany, Japan,
or Italy, and border and neighbor disputes (see supra A. M.
STUYT).
2. see e.g. W. FRIED~~NN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964) at 145 et seq.; L. HENKIN, HOW
NATIONS BEHAVE (2nd ed. 1979) at 25-26; J.G. STARKE, INTRO-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1984) at 47 et seq ..
3. Restatement, Draft No.6, section 101.
4. Restatement, Draft No.6, section 102, paragraph 1.
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5. the development of international law through
the development of the general principles of law common to
the major legal systems of the world does not interest
here.
6. Restatement, Draft No.6, section 102, paragraph 2.
7. see e.g. Restatement, Draft No.6, paragraph
103, Comment b); L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, O. SCHACHTER, H.
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1980) (hereinafter: HENKIN, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW) at 87 et seq.
8. Restatement, Draft No.6, section 103; Article 38
(1) (d) of the statute of the International Court of
Justice, which lists judicial decisions as "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law".
9. for details see infra subchapter B.
10. see e.g. Schachter, The Nature and Process of
legal Development in International Society in The Struc-
ture and Process of International Law, 1983, 745-808.
11. see e.g. Editorial Comment (M. McDougal): The
Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea,
49 AM. J. INT. L. 356-59 (1955); Schachter, The Evolving
International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. (1977) 1, 5 et seq.
12. Schachter, see supra note 10., at 767; at 766
the author gives a further argument for the importance of
judicial decisions: "international lawyers have a strong
tendency to welcome the decisions of judicial tribunals
especially those of the International Court of Justice, as
authoritative as law, even as the touchstone of law."
Jennings, What is International Law and how do we tell
when we see it, 37 SCHW. J. I.R. (1981), at 73 et seq.,
says: "There has long been no room for doubt that interna-
tional law has become very much case law ••• The great value
of decided cases for the development and clarification of
the law is largely because thought is stronger than fic-
tion, and real life throws up circumstances which the most
imaginative writers never thought of •••• Certainly judicial
decisions must become even more important in direct ratio
with the quantity and contradictory nature of modern
material evidence of law. The difficulty of deciding what
the customary law is, can only add authority to a judicial
decision resulting from the careful considerations and
weighing of such material."
13. H. LAUTERPACHT, see supra note 2 of the Introduc-
tion, at 156, 157-220.
21
14. see e.g. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7,
at 89.
14a. The wide discretion of arbitrators makes deci-
sions of them often not foreseeable. State parties,
therefore, tend to refer disputes, which are very important
to them, not to arbitration, but rather settle them by
other means as, ~, negotiations. This is said to be one
of the reasons why there are so few arbitral awards
rendered in disputes between states since the last World
War (~ v. Mangoldt, supra note 1., at 533).
15. see ICSID: Decision of the Ad Hoc Commitee set-
ting aside the Award rendered on the Merits in the Arbitra-
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III. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING THE TAKING
OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY
The international law concerning the taking of
foreign-owned property is ideal to illustrate the impact of
arbitral awards on the development of international law.
The reasons are manifold. There are around a dozen pub-
lished arbitral awards rendered in disputes between states
and aliens dealing with this field of law. The interna-
tional law of takings today is uncertain and vague. The
International Court of Justice has not dealt with nationa-
lization questions in the past several decades.l The law
concerning the taking of alien-owned property, finally, is
an economically extremely important issue for foreign
private investors and states. All these circumstances indi-
cate that arbitral awards rendered in this field of law
might have a strong impact on its development •
.d I . 2 h' f d th d IAs sal ear ler t e lmpact 0 awar s on e eve op-
ment of law can be shown by examining which rules, applied
and developed in arbitral awards, are discussed today as
being within the scope of international law. This chapter,
therefore, after drawing an overview of the economic,
political, historical, and legal background of the interna-
tiona I law rules on the taking of foreign-owned property
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(subchapter A), examines the reasoning in arbitral awards
as to currently controversial questions in that field of
law. Those questions deal with the definition of nationa-
lization and with compensation, with the influence of in-
vestment agreements on the law of nationalizations, with
the applicable law to investment agreements, with the con-
flict between the sovereign right of a state to nationalize
and the principle of pacta sunt sevanda, with stabilization
clauses, and finally with remedies (subchapter B). Subchap-
ter C endeavors to summarize and evaluate the which ar-
bitral awards play in the development of the law concerning
the taking of foreign-owned property.
A. The Law Concerning the Taking of Foreign-Owned
Property: Overview
There have been quite a number of nationali-
zations2a of foreign-owned property in this century.
Latin-American countries like Mexico nationalized alien
property in the first third of the century to reduce the
influence and dependence of their countries from European
nations and the United States and to gain control over
their natural resources.3 The Soviet Union and other
socialist countries nationalized foreign property to
achieve social justice and wealth for all their people in
planned economies. Regions and countries in which natural
resources had been exploited by foreigners, such as oil in
the Middle East,4 copper in Chile'S and bauxite in
Jamaica,6 nationalized foreign property to obtain the
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profits from these exploitations for themselves for use in
the development of their countries. Some politically
unstable developing countries, in which private foreign
investment did not further development as expected,
nationalized foreign property because their governments
thought that a planned economy and state property in means
of production might provide for the welfare of their people
more sucessfully. In 1979 the Iran nationalized out of
ideological reasons.7 France, finally, nationalized in 1982
parts of its industry with the objective of getting better
control over the nation's economy, to improve the welfare
system and reduce unemployment, and to improve the interna-
t· 1 .. .c h . l' d 7a10na compet1t1veness o~ t e nat10na 1n ustry.
The common final goal of most of these nationaliza-
tions was to further the welfare of the people of the
nationalizing country.
Private investors invested in foreign countries to
make as much profits as possible. The undertakings often
were risky, because of the many unforeseeable circumstances
of a foreign investment. Even though investments in for-
eign and especially developing countries, were interesting,
because the prospected profits were higher than those at-
tainable in the home countries of the investors or in other
developed states, the foreign investor was generally not
much interested in the development of a country.
While foreign private investment in the beginning
primarily was seen to be aimed to benefit the investor,
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this view is modified today. In the aftermath of the
Second World War a huge number of former colonies became
independent states, widened the international community of
states and joined the group of the underdeveloped nations.
Since then the economic development of those nations has
been one of the major problems of mankind.8 From those days
on there seemed to be broad consensus that not only inter-
national organizations or governments of developed nations
should be responsible for worldwide economic development,
but that a major force for development was foreign private
investment.9 Even though the negative environmental,
political, and economic effects, which foreign investments
sometimes had, are seen more clearly today, foreign private
investment is still considered to be important.10 Develop-
ing countries have been very anxious to attract foreign in-
vestment to the benefit of the economic development of
their countries.
Today, consequently, both sides, states and foreign
private investors, are interested in investments in host
states. The conflict arises over the question how to share
the benefits and risks of an investment between the inves-
tor, whose goal is profits, and a state, which has to fur-
ther the public welfare.
The international law concerning the taking of foreign
property deals with the legal problems arising out of the
just mentioned conflicting interests.
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It raises different legal issues. These issues are
those of the appropriate international economic order, of
property as a human right, and of the allocation of politi-
cal and economic risks of foreign private investments. The
positions of the states of the world as to these issues are
manifold. They are influenced by widely differing underly-
ing conceptions of private property and contracts and their
function in society, as well as by different views towards
the question which kind of national economic system is more
efficient and suitable to reach certain objectives definded
by a government of a state.11 The different positions are
generally taken by capital exporting western states, of
which the investors usually are nationals, on one hand, and
by the capital importing developing countries on the other.
In 1962 the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Resolution No. 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty
11aover Natural Resources by a vote of 87 in favor to 2 op-
posed with 12 abstentions (principally the Soviet Union and
E t E . ) 11b h b' d' R 1 t'as ern uropean countr~es. Tenon ~n ~ng eso u ~on
was the last one in which a compromise between the capital
exporting and the developing nations on the international
law of the taking of foreign owned property was reached.
Article 4 of the resolution provides: "Nationalization,
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national
interest which are recognized as overriding purely in-
dividual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.
in accordance with international law.
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In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensa-
tion, in accordance with the rules in force in the State
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and
"llc
In the late 1960s the discussion about the interna-
tional economic order and the international law of the
taking of foreign-owned property grew. It reached its peak
after the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Orderl2 and
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States13 by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974.14 The
international economic order erected after the Second WOI.ld
War primarily by Western developed countries was based on
principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all
t·· f d d . I' 15coun r1es 1n matters 0 tra e an econom1C re at1ons.
This economic order resulted in a disproportionate growth
of wealth in developed and developing countries to the dis-
advantage of the latter.16 Through the resolutions the
Third World expressed their view as to an appropriate
economic order, different from the traditional concept.
They wanted the sharing and redistribution of wealth
through the creation of new international law and focussed
on issues like a code of conduct of transnational corpora-
tions, transfer of technology, international trade and in-
vestment, the law of the sea, and on permanent sovereignty
over natural resources.1? Based on the claim of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, which includes all
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wealth and economic activities of a country, the Third
World as to nationalizations took the position, that aris-
ing legal questions should be governed by national laws.18
Each country itself consequently should determine the
standard whether, how and to which extent compensation for
expropriation has to be paid.
The positions held in developing countries have been
sharply rejected especially by Western developed nations.
Their view is that the international law of taking of
foreign-owned property governs nationalizations at least as
a minimum standard and that it is based on the traditional
conception of state responsibility.19 The traditional con-
ception is expressed in the so-called Hull-formula.20 Ac-
cording to the Hull-formula no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without
provisions for prompt, adequate, and effective payment
21therefor. "Despite the challenge by developing states,
the United States and other capital-exporting states have
refused to agree to any change in the traditional prin-
ciples, and have denied that these have been replaced or
modified in customary law by state practice."22
Scholars have suggested ways towards a consensus of
the conflicting views. It was pointed out that neither the
conception held by developed countries on the basis of the
traditional law of state responsibility nor the conception
based on the New International Economic Order could be con-
sidered to be the basis of international law on the taking
B. The Awards
1. Nationalization in General
arbitral awards.
"It results from international customary law, es-
The pages that follow set forth only those legal problems
There are some rules concerning nationalizations which
by one of the contesting groups; a strictly consensual view
The right of a state to nationalize is unquestionable
law will have to be found by searching for common elements
34
of alien property, because neither conception is based on
23international consensus. "The law applicable under such
circumstances cannot coincide with the 'legal opinion' held
of international law is thus excluded. As a result, the
and by determining what will satisfy the broader inter-
ests of the international legal community".24 It was sug-
should be taken also into account. Arbitral case law may
are accepted as such of international law in recent awards.
taking of foreign property national law conceptions of
, l' , 25 d h h 'h f 26natlona lzatlons, an t e uman rlg t 0 property
also play an important role on the road towards consensus.
are discussed that have played a decisive role in recent
gested that in finding the international law concerning the
today.
of the law on the taking of foreign-owned property
the international community as being the law. The exercise
tablished as the result of general practices considered by
of the national sovereignty to nationalize is regarded as
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the expression of the state's territorial sovereignty.
Territorial sovereignty confers upon the state an exclusive
competence to organize as it wishes the economic struc-
tures of its territory and to introduce therein any reform
which may seem to be desireable to it.,,27
A nationalization is lawful under international law
when it is carried out for a public purpose and not dis-
.. t 28crlmlna ory.
A lawful nationalization will impose on the government
concerned the obligation to pay compensation.29
2. Elements that Constitute a Taking
Early arbitral awards already stated that damages in
international law may arise from a variety of types of
wrongful interference with the property, e.g., trespass,
use or occupation, sequestration, expropriation, confisca-
... d . 30 . I I f h I ftlon, lnJury or estructl0n. Specla ru es 0 t e aw 0
state responsibility already had been developed, such as
the principle that where unsucessful insurgents destroy
property, damages are not recoverable.31
Nussbaum summarized the facts of the Lena Goldfields
33 34award as follows: "The Lena Goldfields, Ltd., which
had operated in Siberia as early as Tzarist times, received
from the Soviet Government in 1925 - that is during the
conciliatory N.E.P ..•. period - a vast exploring, mining
and transprotation concession ••• After N.E.P. was replaced
in 1929 by the Five Year Plan, the Soviet Government with-
held from Lena performances, in part of vital nature, owed
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under the concession contract •.• This was followed by a
class war against the Lena employees, as serving a
capitalistic enterprise. Thereupon the company's staff
resigned in large numbers. As a result the company was dis-
organized ..• Finally, on the night of December 15, 1929,
the Government •.. carried out a formidable raid at practi-
cally all of Lena's many establishments which were
seperated from each other by thousands of miles. The
employees, among them the leading officials .•• were seized
and searched and their plans and reports of a technical
character taken away together with confidential documents;
twelve officials were arrested and prosecuted on charges of
'counter-revolutionary activity and espionage' •.• Under
these circumstances the company discontinued the operation
of the plants which, together with the secret technical
process described in the seized documents, were taken over
by the Soviet Government." The Tribunal awarded compensa-
tion on the basis of the principle of "unjust enrichment"
because facts were created by the Soviet Government which
"brought about ••. a total impossibility for Lena of
either performing the concession agreement or enjoying its
benefits."35
According to the Restatement, Draft No.6, an ex-
propriation may be "formal" or "creeping." "While a formal
expropriation involves a taking by a state and transfer of
title to the state, a state may seek to achieve the same
result by taxation and regulatory measures designed to make
37
continued operation of a project uneconomical so -that it is
36soon abandoned."
.
Recent awards have dealt with that issue in the fo1-
lowing manner.
In Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Cong037 the parties entered
into a series of contracts to set up the P1asco company to
manufacture plastic bottles in the Congo. Benvenuti & Bon-
fant, an Italian company, held shares in P1asco. As a
result of a "radicalization" policy of the Government of
the Congo, state agencies interferred in the management of
the P1asco Company. Furthermore, "[b]e1ieving that their
personal safety was no longer guaranteed and on the advice
of ..• , the Charge diAffaires of the Italian Embassy in
Brazzaville, according to whom the arrest of Mr. Bonfant
was imminent, Mr. Bonfant and most of the Italian staff of
P1asco hastily left the Congo •••• The head office of P1asco
was subsequently occupied by the army.,,38 There was no for-
mal act of nationalization. Because the Government treated
P1asco as a state company and because of the institution of
criminal proceedings against Mr. Bonfant without any proven
reason, the tribunal held that Benvenuti & Bonfant was de
facto expropriated of its corporate shares in the P1asco
company. The Tribunal decided on the basis of Congolese
law. However, it also referred to international law. It is
not clear from the award whether the Tribunal was of the
opinion that the just stated principles were only those of
Congolese law.
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Judge Aldrich, the U.S. arbitrator in Chamber Two of
the IRAN-UNITED STATES claims tribunal, in a concurring
stated: "Property may be taken under international law
through interference by a state in the use of that property
or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal
sumption of control over property by a government does not
automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the
property has been taken by the government, thus requiring
compensation under international law, such a conclusion is
warranted whenever events demonstrate, that the owner was
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears
that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The intent
of the government is less important than the effects of the
measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of con-
trol or interference is less important than the reality of
their impact."40 In that case ITT owned IKO, a Swedish cor-
poration, which owned 25 % of IKO Iran. In accordance with
the Act for the Protection and Development of Iran In-
dustries, the directors of IKO Iran were appointed by the
Iranian Government in December 1980, thus ousting the one
director previously selected by ICO Sweden. ITT had
received no profits from the company, not even profits
accrued prior to the assumption of control by the govern-
ment, no information on the affairs of the company, and no
opportunity to vote or even to attend meetings of
39case
•.• , while as-title to the property is not affected ••.
opinion to the award on agreed terms in the ITT
39
shareholders or of the board of directors, or otherwise to
participate in the management of the business.
41In the Starrett Housing interlocutory award one of
the main issues was whether and especially when there was a
taking of St~rrett Housing property by the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Starret Housing Corp. and its
subsidiaries (collectively called "Starrett") were involved
in a program to construct a residential community consist-
ing of 6000 apartments on a 1500 hectare area. "The
claimants contend that their property interests in the
project have been unlawfully taken by the Government of
Iran which has deprived them of the effective use, control
and benefit of their property by means of various actions
h d f 1· h . 'I 4 2t at prevente Starrett rom comp etlng t e proJect.
By the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979 conditions in
Iran made it necessary for most of Starrett's 150 American
supervisors to leave Iran. Strikes and work stoppages had a
devasting impact on securing building materials and carry-
ing on construction at the project in 1978 and 1979. The
collapse of the banking system, the nationalization of the
project financing bank, the freeze of accounts of the
project managing company during 1979 followed. In February
1979 four armed men with machine guns entered the office of
the project managing company and took the project manager
of Starrett to the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guard
in Tehran. Further measures followed. On January 30, 1980
the Ministry of Housing appointed Mr. Erfan as temporary
the Government.
takings.
Judge Lagergren in his award of the Tribunal first
"It has,h .. th' .. 44t elr property ln e proJect managlng company
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been
over property by the government does not automatically and
however, to be borne in mind that assumption of control
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manager of the project managing company to direct all fur-
The Tribunal concluded that there was not sufficient
held, as had previous awards, that property may be taken by
ther activities in connection with the project on behalf of
that at least at the end of January 1980 the claimants had
a state without formal law or decree or transfer of legal
title.43 He further held that there can be little doubt
taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under
international law.,,45 The award then examined the request
been deprived of the effective use, control and benefits of
of Iran towards Starrett to conclude the project and the
allegation that Starrett had abandoned the project for
economic reasons and whether these circumstances would be
reason enough not to declare the measure taken by Iran as
evidence that Starrett could conclude the project itself
and that Starrett gave up the project for economic reasons.
Lagergren then held: "There is no reason to doubt that the
events in Iran prior to January 1980 to which the claimants
refer, seriously hampered their possibilities to proceed
with the construction work and eventually paralysed the
--------------------
41
project. But investors in Iran, like investors in all
other countries, have to assume a risk that the country
might experience strikes, lockouts, disturbances, changes
of the economic and political system, and even revolution.
That any of these risks materialized does not necessarily
mean that property rights affected by such events can be
deemed to have been taken. A revolution as such does not
entitle investors to compensation under international
law.,,46 The American arbitrator Holtzmann concurred. He
was of the opinion, however, that the circumstances pre-
vious to January 30, 1980, already constituted a taking.48
He referred to previous awards and he particularly con-
sidered the reasoning of Judge Lagergren concerning the
. k 11 " l' b' 1 d' 49rlS a ocatlon ln revo utl0ns to e mlS ea lng.
The reasoning in the SEA-LAND award50 is similar to
that in the just described STARRETT HOUSING award. Sea-Land
was a United States corporation engaged in the interna-
tiona 1 transportation by water of containerized cargo.
Sea-Land claimed that it was deprived by the Iranian
Government of the right to continue use of a containerized
cargo facility constructed and operated by it at the port
of Bandar Abbas and added that it suffered losses as a
result. As to the issue of expropriation of its rights the
tribunal held: "Against the background of continued uncer-
tainty and changes in control, it strikes the tribunal as
virtually impossible to use .. [certain] ••acts as the
basis of a finding of expropriation. The tribunal is
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mindful of the fact that the events of which Sea-Land
complains, all took place before August 1, 1979, during
the very period of foment and disorder which preceded and
accompanied the Revolution, and not as a result of the im-
plementation of post-revolutionary policies. A finding of
expropriation would require, at the very least, that the
tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmen-
tal interference with the conduct of Sea-Landis operations,
the effects of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and
benefit of its investment."51
The Tribunal, therefore ,dismissed the claim of Sea-
Land based on expropriation. The American arbitrator, as
in the previous case, took strong exception to the
majority's general statements concerning the elements of a
claim of expropriation, especially as to the sentence cited
above, because it is contrary to the concurring opinion of
Judge Aldrich in the ITT case. There Judge Aldrich stated
that the intent of the government in taking foreign
property is less important.
The TAMS award,52 finally, was rendered by Chamber II
of the IRAN-UNITED STATES tribunal. It contains nothing
new as to the issue of what constitutes a taking.53
3. Compensation
In LENA GOLDFIELDS54 the tribunal stated, as to the
amount of money which had to be paid as compensation for
the taking of Lena Goldfield's rights by the Soviet Govern-
ment, that the present value of Lena's rights and future
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profits has to be paid.55 "The problem is, there£ore,
similar to that of ascertaining a fair purchase price for a
. 56going concern."
Other early arbitral awards held that where the
claimant has been illegally disposed of a mine by force or
violence, damages will be allowed not only for the value of
the claimants interest in the mine, but also for any ore
. d 57selze .
"In Administrative decision No. III, the Mixed Claims
Commission, u.s. and Germany established under the agree-
ment of August 10, 1922, passed upon the 'Measure of
Damages in all Claims for Property taken'. In that Connec-
tion Umpire Parker (for the Commission) stated that fin all
claims based on property taken and not returned to the
private owner the measure of damages which will ordinarily
be applied is the reasonable market value of the property
as of the time and place of the taking in the condition it
then was, if it had such market value; if not, then the
intrinsic value of the property as of such time and
place ...• This rule the Commission will apply in all cases
based on property taken during the period of neutrality. "58
Subsequently, on May 25, 1925 the same Commission stated:
"In computing the reasonable market value of the business
done, their earning capacity based on previous operations,
urgency of demand and readiness to produce to meet such
demand, which may conceivably force the then market value
above reproduction costs, even the goodwill of the
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business, and many other factors, have been taken into
account. But this is quite a different thing from assessing
damage for loss of prospective earnings or profits for a
period of years computed arbitrarily or according to the
earnings of competitors whose properties were not
destroyed, and the awards made by this Commission do not
embrace the items claimed of prospected earnings and
prospective profits".59
Supporters of the NIEO have introduced a new perspec-
tive onthese issues. The view as expressed by, for example,
Arechaga is that any "measure of nationalization or ex-
propriation constitutes the exercise of a sovereign right
of the state and is consequently entirely lawful.,,60 Com-
pensation has to be paid and is based on the concept of
unjust enrichment.61 "The measures which bring about a
transfer of wealth in favor of the nationalizing state or
one of its agencies are those which give rise to a duty to
compensate. Measures such as the total suppression, for
reasons of general policy, of a detrimental or incon-
venient industrial or commercial activity, are not subject
to compensation. The reason is that in those cases no
enrichment is gained by the nationalizing state, even if a
loss has been experienced by the foreign owner. Similarly,
goodwill will not be a ground for compensation when the
abolition of free market conditions of competition nul-
lifies the value of this intangible asset.,,62
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Contrary to this view is that one of the Restatement,
Draft No.6. According to the draft compensation has to be
paid in case of a taking and compensation has to be just.
"The elements constituting just compensation are not fixed
or precise, but, in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances, compensation to be just must be equivalent to the
value of the property taken and must be paid at the time of
taking or with interest from that date and in an economi-
cally useful form. There must be payment for the full value
of the property, usually ±fair market value± where that can
be determined. Such value should take into account 'going
concern value' if any, and other generally recognized prin-
ciples of valuation. Provisions for compensation must be
based on value at the times of takings; •.. interest must
be paid from the time of taking."63
Recent awards decided as follows:
In the TOPCO and in the AMINOIL award63a, which will
be discussed in detail later on, it was stated at length,
that the General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) reflected
the state of customary law existing in this field. Thus
"appropriate compensation" was the decisive general
standard.
In BENVENUTI & BONFANT64 the tribunal had the power to
measure the amount of the compensation for the taking of
the Plasco shares ex aequo et bono.65 It also primarily
decided on the basis of Congolese law.66 The tribunal
based the amount of compensation to be paid by Congo on the
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amount of money which was invested by Benvenuti & Bonfant
because it was the best "objective" criteria available.67
In doing so it took into account that Plasco was more or
less a state enterprise, that there was no market value of
the shares of Plasco, and that Benvenuti & Bonfant's in-
vestment was' just made very few years before the taking.
In his concurring opinion in the ITT case68 Judge
Aldrich measured compensation according to the Treaty of
Amity between the Iran and the United States which in his
view provided for the same principles as international law.
He wrote: "..• , a taking of property must be accompanied by
prompt payment of just compensation which is effective and
adequate to compensate fully for the value of the property
taken. In the absence of a market to determine market
value, the tribunal must endeavor to find the value of the
company as a 'going concern' at the time of taking."69 He
further stated: "I am clear, however, that the relevant
date for the determination of value is the date of the
taking, not an earlier date prior to the revolution ••• , nor
a date subsequent the taking. That Iran might experience
revolution was a risk assumed by investors in Iran, as in
any country; and any reduction in value of investments as a
result of revolution cannot be ignored by the tribunal.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran was not a 'wrong' for which
foreign investors are entitled to compensation under inter-
national law."70
4771One of the crucial problems in the AIG case was the
amount of compensation which had to be paid for a taking.
AIG held shares in the Iran American International In-
surance Company ("Iran America"). On June 25, 1979 all
insurance companies operating in Iran, including Iran
America, were proclaimed nationalized by the Law of
Nationalization of Insurance Corporations. The tribunal
held that compensation had to be paid by Iran. The ap-
propriate method "is to value the company as going concern,
taking into account not only the net book value of its
assets, but also such elements as good will and likely
future profitability,had the company been allowed to con-
72tinue its business under its former management." The
relevant date for valuation is that of the nationaliza-
tion.73 "In ascertaining the going concern value of an en-
terprise at a previous point in time for purpose of estab-
lishing the appropriate quantum of compensation for
nationalization, it is, •• necessary to exclude the effects
of actions taken by the nationalizing state in relation to
the enterprize which actions may have depressed its
value .•• On the other hand, prior changes in the general
political, social and economic conditions which might have
affected the enterprise's business prospects as of the date
the enterprise was taken should be considered.,,74
The Tribunal then examined the reports of the account-
ants of the parties, made corrections according to the
above stated principles, and finally reached an amount of
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compensation to be paid somewhere in the middle of the
accounting reports of the parties. The tribunal did not
explicitly state whether it applied international law or
not, and on which general compensation formula it based the
valuation of the property taken. Mosk, the American ar-
bitrator, concurred. Contrary to the award of the Tribunal
he stated general traditional principles of state respon-
sibility which should determine the amount of compensation.
He concluded that the United States' claimant on the basis
of the submitted material should have gotten a higher
amount of compensation.75
In the TAMS award76, the claimant TAMS, which created
together with AFFA, TAMS-AFFA, an Iranian entity with the
sole purpose of performing engineering and architectural
services, wanted compensation for its expropriated shares
measured by the dissolution value of its interests in TAMS-
AFFA.77 The Tribunal made "only a very rough evaluation of
the assets and liabilities."78 The INA award79, similar to
the AIG award80, deals with the expropriation, through the
Nationalization of Insurance Corporations Act, of a
$285,000 share in an insurance company. The award of the
Tribunal obviously is the result of a compromise between
the arbitrators Holtzmann and Lagergren, who had conflict-
ing views as to the issue of compensation. It, therefore,
contains a result - INA got as compensation its amount in-
vested - but no statement of general principles of the
international law of taking of foreign property. The
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separate opinion of Judge Lagergren is remarkable". He ex-
amined various conceptions of compensation standards and
then stated: liTheprinciples of ±appropriate compensation'
taking into account all relevant circumstances has cer-
tainly found considerable support in recent commentaries,
and would now appear to be regarded as the correct legal
standard at least in cases arising out of large-scale
nationalizations of commercial enterprises of fundamental
importance to the nation's economy, where the Hull standard
seems to be inadequate.IIS1 Moreover, he stated, "I am also
inclined to the view that 'appropriate', 'equitable',
'fair', and 'just' are virtually interchangeable notions
so far as standards of compensation are concerned. Nor is
there any single method of valuation to be used in all
situations of compensation. Instead, there is a wide
choice of well-established methods of valuation applicable
and approriate under different circumstances."S2 Further,
"A tribunal is ••• forced to undertake the task of carefully
identify what factors should be placed on the scale in any
given case in arriving at the 'appropriate' level of com-
pensation.IIS3 Judge Lagergren concluded, "that the ap-
plication of current principles of international law, as
encapsulated in the 'appropriate compensation' formula,
would in a case of lawful large-scale nationalizations in a
state undergoing a process of radical economic restructur-
ing normally require the 'fair market value' standard to be
discounted in taking account of 'all circumstances'.
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However, such discounting may, of course, never be such as
to bring the compensation below the point which would lead
to 'unjust enrichment' of the expropriating state. It
might also be added that the discounting often will be
greater in a situation where the investor has enjoyed the
profits of his capital outlayed over a long period of time,
b t 1 . th ft' t t ,,84u ess, or none, ln e case 0 a recen lnves men ••.
Holtzmann rejects this theory of Lagergren and extensively
refers to more traditional standards for valuating ex-
. t d . ht 85proprla e rlg s.
4. Nationalization and Investment Contracts
Private investors, investing high capital amounts in
foreign countries, try to enter into contractual agreements
with the host state to acquire rights in the host state and
to secure the investment. These investment contracts have
a variety of forms and their contents is determined by the
negotiation power and skill of the host country on the one
hand, and by the foreign investor, on the other. Western
developed countries with strong bargaining positions seldom
enter into such agreements, but require the foreign inves-
tor to submit its investment to the national laws of the
host state.86 Developing countries, however, which ur-
gently need foreign investment are more willing to enter
into such agreements. In the arbitrations between inves-
tors and developing countries discussed below investment
agreements played an important role. The structure and form
of these agreements has changed over the years.
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tracts on the law of nationalizations.
the issue of compensation are disputed.
In case international law governs, in other
which deal with the legal consequences of investment con-
of the international law of nationalizations contain rules,
Traditional concession agreements, which amounted to an
a) The applicable law with respect to investment con-
alienation of control over a substantial area of land to
resources, have been succeded by, ~, joint-venture or
production sharing agreements between the host state and
h f " 87t e orelgn lnvestor.
Part of the rules of the international law concerning
concerning investment contracts, because a taking usually
affects investment contracts concluded between the host
A crucial issue of all investment contracts is by
the taking of foreign-owned property deals with legal rules
the foreign investor used for the exploitation of natural
state and the foreign investor. The different conceptions
tional law.
which law they are governed, by national or by interna-
words when the contract is "internationalized", the effects
of the investment agreement and its stabilization clause on
tracts. Investment agreements may be governed either by
municipal law or by international law. The question of the
applicable law of investment contracts has been disputed. 88
The application of the municipal law of the host state
means that it can by its laws based on its underlying con-
ceptions of property and contract interfere in its
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contractual obligations towards the private investor.89
Internationalization means that the private investor and
the host state are equal partners to a contract which is
governed by the international law rules of investment con-
tracts.90 Whether national or international law applies
decides the amount of damages or compensation that should
be paid by the host state in case of breach of contract or
nationalization of contractual rights.
Arbitral case law has developed a widely accepted ap-
proach.
(1) The oil concession cases
In the ARAMCO-case91 the Arabian American Oil
Company held the rights of a concession agreement concluded
between the Government of the State of Saudi Arabia and the
Standard Oil Company of California in 1933. In 1954 the
Government of Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement with Mr.
A. S. Onassis and his company in which the company was
given a thirty years right of priority for the transport of
Saudi Arabian oil. The issue was whether the latter agree-
ment violated the rights of ARAMCO resulting from the con-
cession agreement from 1933. Though this is not an ex-
propriation case, the award deals among others with the
question of the applicable substantive law to the conces-
sion agreement of 1933. The tribunal stated: "The Arbitral
Tribunal holds, ... , that it has to ascertain the law to be
applied to the merits according to the indications given by
the parties and, failing adequate indications of the
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parties to determine this law by taking all the cir-
cumstances of the case into consideration."92 The tribunal
then examined the contractual character of the concession
agreement93 and pointed out that the parties had not
decided the question which law was applicable to the con-
cession agreement.94 From contractual conflict of laws
principles and some provisions in the concession agreement
the tribunal concluded that some questions in the dispute
are governed by public international law and world wide
custom and practice in the oil business and industry. It
rejected the sole application of Saudi Arabian law because
"certain private rights - which must inevitabley be recog-
nized to the concessionaire if the concession is not to be
deprived of its substance - would not be secured in an un-
questionable manner by the law in force in Saudi Arabia."95
In the SAPPHIRE-case96 the National Iranian Oil
Company, Ltd. (NIOC), and SAPPHIRE Petroleum Ltd.
(SAPPHIRE), a company registered in Canada, entered into an
investment agreement, setting up a joint company IRCAN to
explore and later exploit oil in a certain area in Iran.
Differences arose between the parties. NIOC alledged that
SAPPHIRE had not fulfilled its obligations under the agree-
ment and therefore terminated the agreement. SAPPHIRE in-
itiated the arbitration and wanted among others to recover
the costs of the explorations and lost profits. The case
is not an expropriation case. As to the substantive law ap-
plicable to the interpretation and performace of the
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concession agreement, the tribunal applied principles of
law generally recognized by civilized nations.97 For the
parties did not expressly choose an applicable law, the
arbitrator determined the applicable law according to the
intentions of the parties.98 From different contract
provisions, arbitral case law, and other comparable con-
tracts concluded between NIoe and foreign oil companies,
and especially the idea of protection of the foreign inves-
tor, the arbitrator carne to the conclusion, that principles
of law generally recognized by civilized nations apply: "It
is quite clear from the above that the parties intended to
exclude the application of Iranian law. But they have not
choosen another positive legal system, ..•• All the con-
necting factors above point to the fact that the parties
therefore intended to submit the interpretation and perfor-
mance of their contract to the principles of law generally
recognized by civilized nations, ... The arbitrator will
therefore apply these principles, by following, when
necessary, the decisions taken by international tribunals .
••• Such a solution seems particularly suitable for
giving the guaratees of protection which are indispensable
for foreign companies, since these companies undergo very
considerable risks in bringing financial and technical aid
to countries in the process of development. It is in the
interest of both parties to such agreements that any dis-
pute between them should be settled according to the
general principles universally recognized and should not be
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subject to the particular rules of national laws,' which are
very often unsuitable for solving problems concerning the
rights of the state where the contract is being carried
out, and which are always subject to changes by this state
and are often unknown or not fully known to one of the
contracting parties.,,99
In the Libyan nationalization caseslOO the question of
the applicable substantive law was not really a difficult
issue. BP, the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO), and
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil
Company (TOPCO), had concession rights in Libya. They were
nationalized by the Libyan government. All the concessions
contained the similar, decisive and clear clause: "This
Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accord-
ance with the principles of law of Libya common to the
principles of international law, and in the absence of such
common principles then by and in accordance with the
general principles of law as may have been applied by in-
ternational tribunals."lOl This clause was given effect -
in the TOPCO award combined with a few other considerations
- in all three arbitral awards.
In the AMINOIL case 102, where the rights of a conces-
sion and property rights of the American Independent Oil
Company were nationalized by the Government of the State of
Kuwait in 1977 the tribunal did not finally decide which
law it applied, because the law of Kuwait and international
law were the same as to the questions which had to be
The arbitrators, however, "can have recourse to the
to the dispute (including its rules on the conflicts of
sensus of the parties determines the applicable law. Where
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"Public international law is neces-decided in that case.
sarily a part of the law of Kuwait. "103 The tribunal also
refered to an agreement between the parties and to the ar-
(2) Other investment contracts
In ICSID arbitrations105 the question of the
bitration agreement, which both refered to principles of
law and practice prevailing in the modern world as ap-
plicable law.104
pute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed
by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the
laws) and such rules of international law as may be ap-
applicable law was not a problem. Article 42 of the
Convention106 provides: "The Tribunal shall decide a dis-
plicable." Thus in ICSID arbitrations primarily the con-
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party
law of the State contracting party is applicable and such
part of the sentence makes international law applicable
the parties did not choose the applicable law, the national
rules of international law as may be applicable. This last
national law concerning the legal dispute at hand, or cor-
either complementary, where there are no regulations in the
principles of international law only after having
rective, where the national law violates principles of in-
t' I I 107terna 10na aw.
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researched and established the contents of the law of the
State party to the dispute and after having applied the
relevant rules of that law."108
In the S.P.P. Limited casel09, a dispute decided under
the auspices of the ICC, the Egyptian government entered
into contracts with a foreign corporation to develop
tourist projects in Egypt. The People's Assembly of Egypt
investigated the desirability of the project and the named
special tribunal for that purpose took an unfavorable view.
As a result the Government cancelled the project. S.P.P.
and its parent company claimed damages for breach of the
agreement. There was no express choice of law by the
parties. There was also no reference to ICSID. However,
after citing article 42 of the ICSID Convention the
tribunal further stated: "Obviously the specific provisio
of article 42 only applies to investment agreements and
disputes that may arise thereunder. However, we take the
view that in the world today, there is no reason why this
solution should be limited to a particular category of
state contracts. In other words, the rules formulated in
article 42 can be considered as illustrative of a principle
f 'd l' t' "110o Wl er app lca lon.
Put together as to the question of the applicable law
to investment contracts there is a considerable amount of
uniformity in the arbitral case law. Primarily the intent
of the parties is decisive. If no consensus between the
parties does exist, a general trend is discernable towards
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the application of the national laws of the state party to
investment contracts as far as they do not conflict with
international law rules. Thus it is assured that an inter-
national minimum standard protects the foreign investment
while the state party can apply its national law as far as
the international standard is not devaluated.
b}investment contracts and the principle of pacta sunt
servanda in international law
Takings of foreign investments by host countries
usually affect investment contracts concluded between the
host state and the foreign investor. Where, for example, a
concession right is given to a foreign investor in an in-
vestment agreement, a nationalization not only takes the
property of the investor it also violates the agreement and
thus conflicts with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
The conflict with that principle seems even more obvious if
the investment agreement contained a stabilization clause,
a clause which provides, that the contract will not be al-
tered by whatever means during its term except with the
consent of both parties. In these cases a nationalization
conflicts with the words of an investment agreement.
How international law solves the conflict between the
recognized sovereign right of a state to nationalize and
the principle of pacta sunt servanda is disputed.
Closely connected with that question is another one
which asks, which remedy is available in case of a
nationalization where an investment agreement exist. If
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the sovereign right of a state to nationalize is given
highest priority, then it is not possible that a contrac-
tual obligation can restrict that right. Consequently the
termination of the investment agreement is not a breach of
contract, but a nationalization of contractual rights. As
a result, compensation for nationalization has to be paid.
If the principle of pacta sunt servanda is given highest
authority, then the termination of the concession is a
breach of contract. The available remedy may then be
either damages, a remedy which is traditionally provided
for in Anglo-American legal systems, or restitutio in in-
tegrum, a typical remedy in continental legal systems.
The difference between the solution which awards damages
and the one which provides for compensation is that compen-
sation according to some views has to be appropriate,
while damages have to put the party in the same pecuniary
position that it would have been in if the contract would
have been performed.
Some illustrations may be given for the different
standpoints. Arechaga, who expressed a moderate Third World
view, as to nationalization and investment agreements
wrote: "The agreement and the expectancies thereunder
represent property interests subject to eminent domain of
the territorial state. The measure would thus constitute
the expropriation of the contractual right of a foreign
company: consequently, its legitimacy would be subject to
the payment of 'appropriate compensation' in accordance
nationalization.
ten. An anticipated cancellation in violation of a con-
From these words it is
"This does not mean that such stabilizationand wealth.
stabilization clause was contained in that agreement, this
deprives the host state of the power to put an end to the
clause could also be lawfully breached. That such clause
counter to the fundamental concept and purpose of the per-
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with article 2, paragraph 2 (c), of the Charter".111 If a
concession except with the private party's consent, runs
The opposite view, which is sometimes taken by private
clauses have no legal effect and may be considered unwrit-
tractual stipulation of such a nature would give rise to a
manent sovereignty of a state over its natural resources
special right to compensation; the amount of the indemnity
h . t t' ,,112t e approprla e compensa lone
existence of such clause constitutes a most pertinent cir-
would have to be much higher than in normal cases since the
cumstance which must be taken into account in determining
able remedy if an investment agreement conflicts with a
clear that Arechaga thinks that compensation is the avail-
parties, is that, if a contract is governed by interna-
tional agreement, and any breach of the contract is a
tional law, that contract is converted into an interna-
if a state freely submits its actions to international law
it ordinarily should be held to its bargain.113
violation of international law. The reason given is that
below:
the same results.
"Breaches of development or
commercial reasons, and
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Consequently, either damages or specific performace is the
position as to the available remedy and the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. It states: "it is a violation of in-
available remedy.
tract, the state is acting essentially from governmental
The Restatement, Draft No.6, does not take a precise
ternational law if in repudiating or breaching the con-
Arbitral case law has applied solutions as stated
motives (akin to those that operate in cases of
statement to make a distinction between compensation and
1960s, general principles of internationalized contracts
expropriation) rather than for
f '1 t' "114a1 s to pay compensa 10n.
between a state and a foreign national were laid down.
eluded between a state and a private foreign national. On
cording to 712 (2) of the Restatement, Draft No.6, lead to
damages, because compensation and damages as remedies ac-
concession contracts are similar and often allied to ex-
propriations, •.. , and international law tends to treat the
115wrongs in similar ways." There is no need for the Re-
(1) The oil concession cases
In the SAPPHIRE casel16 which, as said, is not an ex-
propriation casel17 and which was decided in the early
This case is important because the principle of pacta sunt
servanda was recognized as applicable for contracts con-
tion that it would have been in if the contract had been
sunt servanda is the basis of every contractual relation-
full compensation. This compensation includes the loss
"There is a general rule of private law to beh' ,,119s ~p •••
to regard [the rule] set out above as a rule of positive
1 11 'd b . ,,121aw genera y recogn~ze y nat~ons.
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the basis of the factsl18 the tribunal found that there was
a breach of the agreement by NIOC. The tribunal said:
"••• , it is a fundamental principle of law, which is con-
stantly being proclaimed by international courts, that con-
The Tribunal further stated: "According to the
found in positive systems of law, which says that a failure
by one party to a synallagmatic contract to perform its
obligation in breach of contract releases the other party
tractual undertakings must be respected. The rule pacta
from its obligation and gives rise to a right to pecuniary
120compensation in form of damages." "It is necessary •••
party to whom they are awarded in the same pecuniary posi-
generally held view the object of damages is to place the
performed in the manner provided for by the parties at the
sequences of the breach []. This rule is simply a direct
time of its conclusion. They should be the natural con-
deduction from the principle pacta sunt servanda since i~s
therefore natural that the creditor should thereby be given
only effect is to substitute a pecuniary obligation for the
suffered (damnum emergens), for example the expenses
obligation which was promised but not performed. It is
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incurred in performing the contract, and the profit lost
(lucrum cessans), for example the net profit which the con-
122tract would have produced."
Whether this rule is modified in nationalization cases
is the issue in the awards discussed below.
In the Libyan Nationalization cases123 different solu-
tions of similar legal questions were found in the dif-
ferent awards.
In all cases long term concessions were granted to
foreign oil companies which contained stabilization
clauses. The stabilization clauses provided that "the con-
tractual rights expressly created by this concession shall
not be altered, except by mutual consent of the par-
ties."124 In the early 1970s the concession rights were
nationalized. Different arbitrators decided the cases.
Different litigating tactics had been used by the counsel
of the oil companies.125 Different procedural laws were ap-
plied.126 In the context of this thesis only the applied
substantive legal principles as to nationalizations are in-
teresting.
The arbitrator Lagergren in the BP-case, decided in
1973 and 1974, held that "the BP Nationalization Law and
the actions taken thereunder by the Respondent, do con-
stitute a fundamental breach of the BP concession as they
amount to a total repudiation of the agreement and the
obligations of the Respondent thereunder ••• Further, the
taking by the Respondent of the property, rights and
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interests of the Claimant clearly violates public interna-
tional law as it was made for purely extraneous political
reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character.
Nearly two years have now passed since the nationalization,
and the fact that no offer of compensation has been made
indicates that the taking was also confiscatory."127 The
arbitrator then examined at length the effects in law of
this breach. He dealt with the question whether the con-
cession survived the nationalization, and whether specific
performance and restitutio in integrum were available
remedies. After discussing different legal conceptions and
systems, and after discussing international case law, he
require a resolution by the Tribunal are novel in character
and scope in that they have not previously been scrutinised
judicially .. While certain trends in the law are discern-
able, there are no precise and clear rules that provide an
obvious answer to any of the issues. The facts must be ap-
praised and the law interpreted and applied in a balanced
consideration of the intrinsic merits of the case and the
de facto positions of the Parties. An expropriation,
nationalization or taking, if and when implemented in full,
is an act of finallity where a State has exercised its
sovereign territorial power to expel a foreign enterprise
and appropriate its property and other rights. No State
has ever reversed such an action by granting restitutio in
integrum, and it is unlikely that any State exercising
"The real issues of substance whichfurther stated:
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diplomatic protection of its nationals will demand such a
reversal without offering or eventually accepting the al-
ternative remedy, exerciseable at the option of the
defaulting State, of reparation in the form of monetary
compensation. It has rarely been suggested that the
subject-matter in dispute is not property, rights and in-
terests of a purely economic nature on which, thus, a
financial value can be put."128 Lagergren then pointed out
that awarding restitutio in integrum could practically lead
to problems and then concluded that "when by the exercise
of sovereign power a State has commited a fundamental
breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it through
a nationalization of the enterprise and its assets in a
manner which implies finality, the concessionaire is not
entitled to call for specific performance by the Government
of the agreement and reinstatement of his contractual
. ht b t h' 1 d' . f d "129r1g s, u 1S so e reme y 1S an act10n or amages.
There was no decision as to the amount of damages which had
to be paid in this award.
Much was written about the TOPCO award130 rendered by
131the arbitrator Dupuy. Some rules, developed in this
award were seldom applied in later awards. Dupuy accepted
h . ht ft' 1 . 132 .f ht e r1g 0 a s ate to nat10na 1ze. However, 1 t ere
was a concession agreement with a stabilization clause a
state did not have the right to disregard its contractual
obligation: "••• the recognition by international law of
the right to nationalize is not sufficient ground to
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empower a State to disregard its commitments, because the
same law also recognizes the power of a state to commit
itself internationally, especially by accepting the inclu-
sion of stabilization clauses in a contract entered into
with a foreign private party."133 A nationalization there-
fore does not end the internationalized concession agree-
mente The arbitrator then examined the legal consequences
of Libya's non-performance of its contractual obligations.
After an elaborate review of Libyan and international deci-
sions and writings Dupuy concluded that restitutio in in-
tegrum is the normal sanction for non-performance of con-
tractual obligations under international law and that this
sanction is inapplicable only to the extent that restora-
t· f th t ... b1 134 h d~on 0 e s atus quo ante ~s ~mposs~ e. T us accor -
ing to the award Libya was obliged to perform its obliga-
135tions under the concession agreement.
In the LIAMCO case136 the sole arbitrator Mahmassani
stated: "a) The right of property, including the incor-
poreal property of concession rights, is inviolable in
principle, subject to the requirements of its social func-
tion and public well-being. b) Contracts, including con-
cession agreements constitute the law of the parties, by
which they are mutually bound. c) The right of a State to
nationalize its wealth and natural resources is sovereign,
subject to the obligation of indemnification for premature
termination of concession agreements. d) Nationalization
of concession rights if not discriminatory and not
as such, and constitutes not a tort but a source of
compensation. The arbitrator went on to state that there
Be-
As to lost
139resources."
As "equitable compensation" he
liability to compensate the concessionaire for said prema-
137ture termination of the concession agreements."
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accompanied by a wrongful act or conduct, is not unlawful
is no difficulty that the compensation "should include as a
lost profits common to international law and Libyan law he
11' d' . d "138sta atlons, an varlOUS expenses lncurre •
LIAMCO'S concession thus could be terminated against just
minimum the damnum emergens, e.g., the value of the na-
profits he said: "In the light of such frequent contem-
porary international practice, the classical doctrine con-
tionalized corporeal property, including all assets, in-
nationalize their natural wealth and
.. 1 f .t 140prlnclp e 0 equl y.
right of property and of the sovereign right of States to
US corporation, 1948 entered into a concession agreement
influence of the recent evolution of the concept of the
cerning the determination of compensation has undergone the
applied by international tribunals and especially to the
gas. Different changes in the terms of the agreement were
refered to the general principles of law as may have been
cause he did not find settled rules as to the question of
awarded LIAMCO for lost profits $66 millions instead of the
claimed $186 millions.141
The AMINOIL case142 was decided in 1982. AMINOIL, an
with the ruler of Kuwait to explore and exploit oil and
suant to the terms of the renegotiation clause and sub-
not expressly stabilize the contract against nationaliza-
Later a renegotiation clause was
"No doubt contractual limita-
143clause.stabilization
reached. In 1977 the rights and property of AMINOIL in
to long lasting negotiations in which the parties dis-
steadily reducing the profits of AMINOIL. This finally led
added. 144 In the 1970s Kuwait acquired step by step the
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made over the years. The original agreement contained a
the concession into a service contract. No consensus was
cussed the nationalization of AMINOIL and the change of
with a market share of around 2.5%. Over the years pur-
and nationalization the tribunal held that the clause did
Kuwait were nationalized. As to the stabilization clause
ownership of the oil industry in its country. After 1975
sequent negotiations the terms of the concession changed,
AMINOIL was the only foreign private oil company in Kuwait
tions and that the clause therefore did not make the
nationalization unlawful.
possible, but what that would involve would be a par-
tions on the State's right to nationalize are juridically
ticularly serious undertaking which would have to be
expressly stipulated for, and be within the regulations
governing the conclusion of State contracts; and it is to
be expected that it should cover only a relatively limited
period. In the present case however, the existence of such
a stipulation would have to be presumed as being covered by
the general language of the stabilization clauses, and over
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the whole period of an especially long concession since it
extended to 60 years. A limitation on the sovereign rights
of the State is all the less to be presumed where the con-
cessionaire is in any event in possession of important
guarantees regarding its essential interests in the shape
of a legal right to eventual compensation."145 Addi-
tionally, the tribunal pointed out that the concession
agreement changed its character considerably over the years
because of the many renegotiations. Thus, the tribunal con-
cluded, that the stabilization clause did not any more
prohibit any taking by the government.146 The nationaliza-
tion as a unilateral act was also not consistent with the
renegotiation clause, which provided that changes in the
contract need the consent of both parties. The tribunal
argued on the basis of the facts of the specific case: it
was clear to the parties that the result of the nego-
tiations would be the same as a nationalization. Only as
to the terms of the nationalization disagreement existed.
Under these cicumstances the Tribunal did not declare the
nationalization illegitimate because of the renegotiation
clause.147 The Tribunal finally concluded that Kuwait owed
indemnification to AMINOIL for the legitimate taking. As
to general compensation principles the tribunal turned to
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1803
(XVII) of December 14, 1962, an Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, article 4, which provides for
siders that the determination of the amount of an award of
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appropriate compensation in case of lawful nationaliza-
tions.148 The award further stated: "The Tribunal con-
"The Tribunal will thereforean important investor abroad.
tion. The tribunal on the basis of the specific facts of
the case elaborately determined the amount of compensation,
which had to be paid by Kuwait.ISI
(2) Other cases
The number of other published nationalization cases
involving investment agreement problems is small.
"appropriate" compensation is better carried out by means
of an enquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the
particular concrete case, than through abstract theoretical
discussion. Moreover the Charter of the Economic Rights
and Duties of States, even in its most disputed clause
(Article 2 paragraph 2c)) - and the one that occasioned
reservations on the part of the industrialized States -
recommended taking account of "all circumstances" in order
to determine the amount of compensation - which does not in
any way exclude a substantial indemnity."149 The two im-
portant general circumstances in this case are, first, that
Kuwait itself is a country favoring foreign investment and
confine itself to registering that in the case of the
present dispute there is no room for rules of compensation
that make nonsense of foreign investment."IS0 The
second important factor is that the parties invoked the no-
tion of "legitimate expectations" for deciding on compensa-
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The AGIP case152 was decided under the auspices of
ICSID. AGIP which was the 90% owner of "AGIP (Brazzaville)
S.A.", operating in the oil products distribution sector,
entered into an agreement with the Congo in which the lat-
ter bought 50% of the AGIP (Brazzaville) shares, undertook
various other contractual obligations, and which contained
a stabilization clause as to the status of AGIP
(Brazzaville). As a result of a radicalization policy of
the People's Republic of the Congo the government took over
the company in 1975 and did not fulfill its contractual
obligations towards AGIP. AGIP claimed compensation and
damages. To most legal questions that arose in the dispute
the tribunal applied Congolese law. The tribunal applied
. t t . 1 1 ff t f th b1 . t . 1 153ln erna lona aw on e ec 0 e sta lza lon cause.
The tribunal stated that "although there can nowadays be no
doubt concerning the right of a state to nationalize, in
the light of consistent international practice, positive
international law also recognizes that in concluding an in-
ternational agreement with a private individual the State
exercises sovereign powers from the moment consent is
freely given."154 The unilaterally decided dissolution by
the Congo through its Taking Order represented a repudia-
. f h b' 1 . t' 1 155 C t1 thtlon 0 testa 1 lza lon cause. onsequen y e
Government was obligated to compensate AGIP for the damage
it suffered from the nationalization.156 The amount of
damages, including lost profits, was awarded according to
Congolese law.
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In the S.P.P. Limited case1S7, principles of interna-
tional law which were developed or applied in previous
awards were confirmed. Though the award primarily applied
Egyptian law, it also stated: "Reference to the Libyan
cases is made only with a view to stressing the common
principles emerging from the three arbitrations whereby the
executive or even the legislative act of a sovereign power
can be treated as a breach of contract. This finding leads
to the conclusion that the principle pacta sunt servanda
(common both to Egyptian and the international legal
system) only apparently conflicts with the State's
legitimate prerogative to issue expropriatory measures af-
f t· b .. ,. t "lS8ec lng USlness concerns operatlng on ltS terrl ory.
The tribunal then stated that there was a breach of the
investment agreement by Egypt and that S.P.P. Limited was
entitled to damages. The tribunal awarded damages includ-
ing damnum emergens as well as lucrum cessans no greater
than those which could have normally been foreseen at the
time of entering into the contract according to Egyptian
law.1S9
In summary, it can be said that in most awards - other
than the LIAMCO award - the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda has been given priority over the sovereign right of a
state to nationalize. Damages has been the generally ac-
cepted remedy, except in the TOPCO award, if a nationaliza-
tion was contrary to a stabilization clause. Standards for
the validity of a stabilization clause were developed in
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the AMINOIL award. It should be noted that damagBs have
been said to include damnum emergens as well as lucrum ces-
sans. As is clear from the AMINOIL award there is a dif-
ference between damages and compensation.
C. Conclusion: The Impact of Arbitral Awards on the
Development of the International Law Concerning the
Taking of Foreign-Owned Property
The awards discussed above did not develop or apply a
uniform system of international rules concerning the taking
of foreign-owned property. To develop such a system a
larger number of published awards would be necessary. The
published awards also are not always concurring as to the
applied rules. Contradictions do exist. However, some
general rules or at least some trends in which the rules
might develop can be said to exist at present. Examples of
these rules are the definition of a taking, the principle
that compensation has to be appropriate, the law applicable
to investment contracts, and that restitutio in integrum is
generally not the available remedy in case of breach of an
investment agreement. Still unsolved are the details of
the principles which determine the amount of compensation.
Here solutions based on the circumstances of each case are
suggested. They may lead to fair results in each case.
The rules applied in the awards are often a compromise
between the extreme positions taken by the developing
countries on one hand and by the developed, capital export-
ing countries on the other. The need to decide a case as
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more and more nations have ratified the ICSID Conven-
clauses in various awards.
The acceptance of awards may also be the result
Deciding on a case by case basis arbitrators also may
The results of the arbitrations, though controversial,
Arbitral awards can also solve newly arising problems
be difficult. The details of the rules according to which
and thus give directions to the development of interna-
fairly as possible, to take responsibility for the outcome
states. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why
tional law. An example is the dealing with stabilization
have in general been accepted by a broad majority of
of a dispute, has obligated arbitrators to take positions
of each case, is an example.
t' 16010n.
compensation has to be paid according to the circumstances
which are usually where somewhere in the middle.
decide questions of detail regarding international rules
whose developement by treaties or by state practice would
of the fact that modern investment protection agreements
between states take the arbitral case law into account,
sometimes only insofar as explicit provisions do provide
for rules which are different from dispositive rules
developed in the arbitral case law. No legal advisor to a
government or a foreign investor can give good advice as to
investment contracts, their applicable law, their arbitra-
tion clauses, or other provisions securing the investment
without taking into account the rules developed in the
awards as those of international law. This does not neces-
ments between host countries and investors' home countries
In scholarly writing on expropriations'd . 161conSl eratl0n.
in France in 1982, took the modern arbitral case law into
the awards usually play an important role.162
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awards. Recent nationalizations, like the nationalizations
plied in the awards are already those of international law.
and acceptance of the rules as international law is neces-
sary for the rules to be those of international law. Such
treaty law and uniform principles of law recognized by civ-
ilized nations, state practice in accordance with the rules
However, it is difficult to say whether the rules ap-
As explained in the second chapter, in the absence of
awards is difficult to find. It may be argued that the con-
provisions also is an expression that the parties accepted
clusion of the multitude of investment protection agree-
common state practice as to the rules developed in the
sarily mean that the countries which are parties to such
conclusion of the many investment agreements between the
foreign investor and the host state containing arbitration
the rules which were developed and applied in existing
which usually provide for arbitration of disputes and the
agreements do accept all rules developed and applied in
applied in most awards are accepted as international law.
taking of foreign-owned property created international law.
each award as law. It may mean that the rules which were
Thus arbitral awards rendered in the field of the law of
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Another point has to be made. The rules applied in
arbitral awards often have been developed previously in
scholarly writings or have been formulated as legal posi-
tions of the disputing parties. What is the impact ar-
bitral awards do have on international law, if the rules
applied by the arbitrators were not new? If one goes so
far to say, as in the previous paragraph, that some rules
applied and developed in the awards in the field of taking
of foreign-owned property are already international law,
then their application in arbitral awards transformed the
rules into international law. If one rejects that view,
what arbitral awards do in applying such already developed
rules is to give them more authority and make it more
likely that states through practice as law later accept
them as international law.
Put together it can be said that arbitral awards do
have an impact on the development of the international law
of the taking of foreign-owned property; it even can be
argued that the awards created rules of law in this field.
In any case the awards have brought more certainty to some
questions of this field of law.
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81. see supra endnote to II. 36, at 317.
82. id. , at 318.
83. id. , at 319.
84. id.It is noteWorthy that M. WHITEMAN, see supra note 30, in
the conclusion of Vol. II in 1937 already wrote:
"There are numerous considerations that may well be, and
often should be, borne in mind in fixing the amount of the
damages. These considerations have been described in the
cases hereinbefore set forth as market price, selling
price, sale value, average value in the vicinity,
reasonable market value, auction price, insured value, tax
value, invoice value, original cost, actual cost, retail
cost, cost of replacement, cost of repair, depreciation,
etc. Any and all of these standards of value are properly
considered as evidence of the amount that will fairly
compensate the individual claimant in the light of the
particular circumstances of a given case. And no one of
these criteria is necessarily the sole guide if an in-
telligent measure of damage is made.",(id., at 1548).
"Rules specifying that just compensationor fair compensa-
tion should be made, instead of stating how damages are
measured, indicate what the final product should be. They
describe the end sought to be reached. So too, the rules
prescribing the making good of the damage, the placing of
the claimant in as good a position as he was before the
loss suffered, the reviving of the status quo ante, etc.,
describe the proper end to be attained, including the
limits of the end sought, but leave much to be desired."
(id., at 1548).
85. INA award, endnote to II 36, at 319 et seq.
86. see, e.g. Higgins, supra note 23, at 305-311, where
the author describes the law and practice of agree-
ments with oil exploiting investors in the united Kingdom.
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87. see Sornaraja, supra note 9, at 81 et seq., with
further references.
88. see supra page 37 et seq.
89. Fatouros, International Law and the International-
ized Contract, 74 AJIL 134 (1980), at 136 et seq.
90. in general see Mann, The Theoretical Approach
towards the Law overnin Contracts between States and
Private Persons, RBDI (1975 562-567; Seidl-Hohenveldern,
The Theory of quasi-international and partly international
Agreements, RBDI (1975) 567-570.
91. see supra endnote to II. 36.
92. id. , at 156.
93. ide , at 164.
94. id. , at 166.
95. ide , at 169.
96. see supra endnote to II. 36; the case is discussed
by Suratgar, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 152 (1965).
97. id., at 164 et seq.
98. id., at 171.
99. id., at 176.
100. the BP case, the TOPCO case, and the LIAMCO case,
~ supra endnote to II. 36.
101. see TOPCO at 15, LIAMCO at 172, BP at 327 et seq.
102. see supra endnote to II. 36.
103. id., at 1000.
104. ide
105. ~ AGIP case, BENVENUTI & BONFANT case, both see
supra endnote to II. 36.
106. see supra endnote to II. 36.
107. Kloeckner Annulment Award, supra endnote to II 36,
at 168.
108. id., at 170.
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109. see supra endnote to II. 36.
110. id. at 769.
As to the applicable law a more traditional position
combined with a barely convincing reasoning was taken by
the arbitrators in the Revere Copper v. OPIC award (see
supra endnote to II. 36). This award was rendered in-an ar-
bitration held under the auspices of the American Arbitra-
tion Assosiation. Because only american parties were in-
volved the authoritative value of this decision is doubt-
ful. (see Dolzer, Nationale Investitionsversicherung und
voe1kerrechtliches Enteignungsrecht, Bemerkungen zum Revere
Copper Fall, 42 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND OEF-
FENTLICHES RECHT UND VOELKERRECHT 480 (1982). Revere Cop-
per invested in the bauxite industry in Jamaica after con-
cluding an investment agreement with the government.
Jamaica breached the agreement which led finally to con-
siderable losses and the close down of the operation.
Revere Copper claimed compensation for losses resulting
from expropriatory actions from OPIC, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, on the basis of the foreign invest-
ment insurence contract concluded with OPIC. The investment
agreement concluded between Revere Copper and Jamaica was
silent as to the applicable law to that agreement. The
tribunal held the agreement to be internationalized because
it was an economic development agreement (id., at 276) and
because of guaranty agreements concluded between the US and
Jamaica (id., at 277 et seq.) which provided that Jamaica
will recognize all rights of OPIC which OPIC acquires pur-
suant to fulfilling its obligation towards an US investor
whose property in Jamaica was nationalized. Because these
acquired rights then would be those between governments
(OPIC is an US governmental entity) the investment
agreement between Revere Copper and Jamaica was interna-
tionalized (id., at 278).
11l. Arechaga, supra note 60, at 228.
112. id. , at 229 et seq.
113. Restatement, Draft No. 6, Section 712, Note 9.
114. Restatement, Draft No. 6, Section 712, Note 8.
115. see supra note 113.
116. see supra endnote to II. 36.
117. see supra at page 6l.
118. as to the facts see supra at page 6l.
119. see supra endnot to II. 36, at 181.
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120. id. , at 182.
121. ide , at 183.
122. id. , at 185 et seq.
123. see supra note 100.
124. BP at 298; LIAMCO at 141; TOPCO at 24.
125. see in detail v. Mehren, Kourides, International
Arbitration between States and Foreign Private Parties: The
Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AJIL 478 (1981).
126. ide
126a. BP award, see supra endnote to II. 36, at 329.
127. id. , at 353.
128. ide , at 354.
129. id. , at 355.
130. see supra endnote to II. 36.
131. see only Editorial Comment (Fatouros), supra note
89; White, Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions: Two
Conflicting International Arbitrations, 30 INT'L & COMPo
L.Q. 1 (1981); Casenotes (Varna), Petroleum Concessions in
International Arbitration: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany v. Libyan Arab Republic, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
259 (1979); v. Mehren, Kourides, supra note 125.
132. TOPCO award, supra endnote to II. 36, at 21.
133. id., at 24 et seq.
134. id., at 36.
135. it was pointed out that the problem with Dupuy's
solution is that the enforcement of such award will lead to
difficulties and that it is doubtful whether the cited
authority actually supports the view that specific perfor-
mance is a rule in international law in case of non-
performance of contractual obligations, see Varna, supra
note 129, at 287 et seq.
136. see supra endnote to II. 36.
137. id., at 196 et seq.
138. id., at 201.
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139. id. , at 206.
140. id. , at 209.
141. id. , at 214.
142. see supra endnote to II. 36; the award is discussed
by Teson, State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The
Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984);
Tschanz, The Contribution of the Aminoil Award to the Law
of State Contracts, 18 INT'L LAWYER 245 (1984).
143. see supra endnote to II. 36, at 990.
144. id. , at 992.
145. id. , at 1023.
146. id. , at 1024.
147. id. , at 1026.
148. see supra note 63a.
149. AMINOIL award see supra endnote to II. 36, at 1032.
150. id., at 1033.
151. for details see id., at 1034-1042.
152. see supra endnote to II. 36.
153. id., at 735.
154. id.
155. id.
156. id., at 736.
157. see supra endnote to II. 36.
158. id., at 774.
159. id, at 782.
160. to explain this development only with the pressures
exercised by the World Bank in connection with the giving
of credits to host states is not sufficient.
161. G. Burdeau, see supra note 7a, at 40.
162. an exception is Dolzer, supra note 20; in his 300
page book only on one page he cites the libyan oil cases in
88
the text. Reason may be that his approach towards the issue
from the human rights viewpoint is not that of the majority
of writers and of arbitral awards, which systematically lo-
cate the law of expropriation as being part of the economic
development law.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The field of law in which the impact of arbitral
awards on international law was shown was especially dis-
puted on the international plane. International consensus
as to the rules of law on the taking of foreign-owned
property did not develop among states. Arbitral case law
showed a path along which state practice might create in-
ternational nationalization law based on consensus. The
work of international arbitral institutions like ICSID, the
still growing importance and acceptance of ad hoc or in-
stitutional arbitration as method of dispute settlement of
investment disputes and the necessity to settle the dis-
putes, have resulted in a number of published awards set-
ting directions towards consensus.
Using arbitration as procedural way to reach an inter-
national consensus on substantial law issues could also be
a method of promoting consensus in many other international
disputes on legal questions raised in the United Nations
Resolutions of the early 1970s •.
The regulation of the international arbitral process
has reached a standard, which can guarantee fair results
and which is respected by many states. This respect par-
ticularly demonstrated by the large number of parties to
the ICSID Convention, by the 1976 UNCITRAL arbitration
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rules which were adopted unanimously by the United Nations
General Assembly, and by the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of foreign Arbitral
Awards which enjoys wide acceptance. Nevertheless, im-
provements in the arbitral process are still needed. The
recent ICSID annulment awards are an example. Arbitration
mechanisms comparable to the ICSID mechanism may be needed
in other fields of international law. Where the
arbitration process functions well and fair awards can be
expected to be rendered by arbitrators, there is no reason
why the rules applied in these awards, if supported by
reasonable arguments, should not be cornerstones in inter-
national law.
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